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Due to increased adoption of irrigation and advancements in technology, producers in the
Mississippi Delta have been unsustainably depleting the water stocks in the Mississippi
River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVAA). This research investigates the impacts of
various regulatory threats uniformly applied to heterogeneously located producers to
avert further overexploitation of the MRVAA. If a regulatory threat successfully
incentivizes reduction of producers’ extraction rates, costly implementation of a binding
limited-use regulation could be avoided. Laboratory experiments incorporating the major
characteristics of the MRVAA were conducted to test two threatened uniform policies,
limited-use and moratorium. The main finding of the research is that even with the threat
of a moratorium, the regulatory trigger point was too lax to result in significantly slowing
over exploitation of the water resource.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The increased adoption of irrigation and advancements in technology have led to
increased crop yields required to meet the ever increasing consumer demand. However,
increased irrigation has led to the depletion of numerous aquifers in the United States
(Smith et al., 2017). It has long been observed that the water levels of the Mississippi
River Valley Alluvial Aquifer in the Mississippi Delta (MRVAA) are declining.
Unsustainable exploitation of aquifers is an important issue for society and government
agencies with the responsibility to regulate and monitor the sustainable usage of this life
sustaining natural resource. The motivation for this study is to analyze the potential
impacts of a set of government regulatory responses to stem the likelihood of the
overexploitation of the MRVAA.
Effective Management of Common Pool Resources
The MRVAA is best characterized as a common pool resource (CPR). The
characteristics of a CPR are subtractability and non-excludability (Ostrom et al., 1993).
In regards to subtractability, the MRVAA contains groundwater that when extracted by
an individual, decreases the available groundwater for another producer. In regards to
non-excludability, it was not until 1985 that the State of Mississippi required producers to
purchase a well permit from the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ).
1

Researchers have long debated whether [external] government regulation or
[internal] self-governance is the most efficient mechanism to avoid over exploitation of
CPR’s. In support of government regulation, Hardin (1968) predicted that, without
government intervention or establishing and enforcing private property rights, complete
depletion of natural resources is inevitable. This is commonly referred to as the “Tragedy
of the Commons”. The cause of the resource’s destruction is due to the individual user’s
incentives to maximize personal profit without concern for their impacts on others, and
hence negatively impacts social welfare.
Later, Gardner et al. (1997) concludes that under a Prior Appropriation Doctrine,
entry restrictions may be implemented to reduce rent dissipation and increase average
efficiency. Water laws in States that have instituted a Correlative Rights Doctrine
(Riparian Rights Doctrine) imposing stock quotas limiting the amount of water extracted
may distinctly improve management performance.
Other scholars have argued that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is not inevitable
and that government regulation is not necessarily required at localized levels (e.g.,
Ostrom et al., 1999; Walker & Gardner, 1992; Seabright, 1993). They insist established
informal arrangements or traditional customs are viable alternatives to facilitate
cooperation for sustainable resource management. Among the relevant literature, the
four most effective self-governing mechanisms are: non-binding face-to-face
communication, binding bilateral bargaining, resource allocation through auctions, and an
imposed sanctioning institution (Ostrom et al., 1993; Walker et al., 2000; Casari & Plott,
2003; Holt et al., 2012).
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Lewis & Cowen (1983) establishes five necessary conditions for a cooperative
solution without the presence of any institutions. 1 Upon further examination of Lewis &
Cowen’s model, Blomquist & Ostrom (1985) state their assumptions present unrealistic
conditions. The authors proceed to describe institutional arrangements that facilitate
voluntary agreements improving the probability of satisfying each of the five conditions
to achieve a comparable solution.
Finally, Ostrom et al. (1999) concluded that a universal solution mechanism for
resolving every CPR dilemma does not exist. This is because of heterogeneity pertaining
to certain CPR characteristics such as: size, scope, and resource dynamics. Ostrom et al.
(1999) go on to state that self-governance mechanisms are better suited for management
of small-scale CPRs with a limited number of producers. However, large-scale complex
irrigation systems comprising many producers with separate interests, may require an
exogenous central authority to prescribe a mechanism benefitting both the producers of
the resource, as well as the resource itself. Therefore, any potential solution mechanism
resolving CPR dilemmas must be evaluated based on its size, number of producers, and
as well as on its unique physical characteristics of the resource.

1

Information condition assume individuals have complete information about resource characteristics (e.g.
capacity, growth rate, safe yield, their own and other’s exploitation, total number of producers, and
incremental differences from defection. Communication condition assume immediate, perfect, and
costless communication. A caveat is a positive correlation between the number of producers and
negotiating and monitoring costs. Symmetry condition assumes all individuals are homogeneous in
resource usage, accrued benefits, and equity (fairness). Enforcement (deterrence) condition assumes the
deterrent threat to be “everyone defects from their strategy forever if any individual defects once.”
Monitoring condition assumes perfect and costless monitoring resulting from the information condition.
All conditions must be satisfied and policed by each respective user to result in an indefinite cooperative
arrangement (Lewis & Cowen, 1983).
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Given the previous discussion, it appears that the MRVAA may be better
managed by [external] government regulation due its size and number of potential
producers. The MRVAA covers 2,762,236 acres in the Mississippi Delta, of which
roughly 65 percent of the hectares are irrigated (Kebede et al., 2014). In 2012, the
MRVAA has the possibility of serving 7,084 Delta farms.2
MRVAA Characteristics and Regulatory Background
The MRVAA is a shallow aquifer with a relatively fast recharge rate, ranging
from parts of southwestern Arkansas, northeastern part of Louisiana, western border of
Tennessee, and the northwestern part of Mississippi, known as the ‘Mississippi Delta’
(Coupe et al., 2012). The Mississippi Delta’s climate is humid subtropical and receives an
abundance of average rainfall of more than 130cm, however, only 28% of the rainfall
occurs during the growing season (Coupe et al., 2012). Because much of the soils in the
region are composed of heavy clay, relatively little recharge can be attributed to
percolation. Instead, rivers and streams provide most of the recharge from the sides of
the aquifer.
The demands on the MRVAA have been increasing over time. Since the 1950’s,
extraction from the MRVAA has increased in part because of the poor quality (e.g.
chemicals and sediments) and reliability of the surface water. Additionally, government
policies have affected the crop selection in the U.S. and the Mississippi Delta toward
more water intensive crops. For instance, the Renewable Fuel Standard Program was

2

https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2_County_Level/Miss
issippi/

4

designed to help combat pollution through the usage of gasoline and reduce foreign
energy dependence.3 This policy has contributed to rising corn prices, which has led
many cotton producers to switch to corn. Table 1.1 displays the percent change in
planted acres for Mississippi’s top 3 row crops. As opposed to cotton, the production of
corn requires significantly higher levels of water.
Table 1.1
Crop

Percent Change in Planted Acres and Recommended Irrigation Application
for Mississippi’s Top 3 Row Crops
Planted Acres Planted Acres Percent
1970
2016
Change

Recommended Irrigation
Application
(acre/feet)
Soybeans
2,630,000
2,040,000
-22.43
0.9
Corn
304,000
750,000
+146.71
0.9
Cotton
1,235,000
435,000
-64.78
0.6
Source: https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/E47EBD7D-1088-3828-8B519F339838450E

Even though the Delta region receives significant annual precipitation, as
compared to the Midwest and West, precipitation is the least during the growing seasons
for most row crops, especially corn. As such, [Mississippi] Delta producers utilize
irrigation to combat the uneven seasonal distributions of precipitation (Coupe et al.,
2012). Though stochastic rain events during the growing season helps buffer ground
water extraction, the rainfall has not proven dependable enough for stable corn
production.
The increasing use of ground water for agriculture in the [Mississippi] Delta has
led to declining water table levels (Coupe et al. 2012). Figure 1.1 demonstrates two

3

The RFS was enacted under the 2005 Energy Policy Act and expanded within the 2007
Energy Independence and Security Act (Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 2016).
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attributes of the MRVAA over time. First, since the 1950’s, water levels have declined.
Secondly, the MRVAA exhibits a cross-sectional heterogeneous water levels. Figure 1.2
is an area map of the current water level status of the MRVAA. As can be seen, water
levels are the lowest in the more central regions. This is often referred to as the ‘cone of
depression’.
The MRVAA is not a static aquifer, but appears to have some flow dynamics.
From a geo-survey, Coupe et al. (2012) identifies that the MRVAA generally flows from
north to south. Recharge primarily flows from north to south and bordered by the northto-south flowing Mississippi River to the west and the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha rivers
to the east. The Sunflower River flows north to south and lies above the central portion
of the MRVAA where the cone of depression is most prominent. YMD (2006) make
note that in recent history the Sunflower River often runs dry during the summer months.
Because of the spatial and flow dynamics of the MRVAA, producer wells located
sequentially along the general flow creates an assignment problem. The cone of
depression in the MRVAA identifies asymmetrically endowed producers, most likely in
regards to recharge. Producers located at the northern end of the MRVAA’s natural
recharge entry point experience higher recharge rates than those to the south and central
regions.

6

Figure 1.1

Cross-sectional representation of heterogeneous water levels in MRVAA
over time

Source: http://www.ymd.org/pdfs/deltairrigationmeetings/charlottebyrd.pdf

7

Figure 1.2

Post-harvest ending MRVAA water levels measured from surface

Source: http://www.ymd.org/pdfs/waterlevel/YMDWaterLevelsSpring2016Report.pdf
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In response to depleting water resources, the state of Mississippi instituted the
Riparian Rights Doctrine in 1985 (Whittington, 2014). The adoption of the law gave
ownership of all public waterbodies to the State.4 By Executive Order No. 1341,
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) was formed and charged with
the responsibility to regulate the usage of all surface and groundwater in order to ensure
maximum sustainable use of the water in the state. By Mississippi Code Ann. §51-3-1,
“It is hereby declared that the general welfare of the people of the State of Mississippi
requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent
of which they are capable, ….”. Within Mississippi Code Ann. §49-2-7 and §51-3-1, the
Commission of Environmental Quality (CEQ) Task Force was established to develop and
promote actions ensuring future water supplies for long run sustainability within the
Mississippi Delta.
Acquisition of permits to use the State’s water are purchased through the
Environmental Quality Permit Board (EQPB). Since then, the number of permitted wells
have risen from 2,823 in 1987 to 19,410 in 2015 in the Mississippi Delta alone (Wood et
al., 2017). In economics, this is referred to as the extensive margin. Until 2016, a well
permit cost $10 and lasted for 10 years. Now, permit duration has been reduced to 5
years. To which extent EQPB have or currently deny new permits is unknown.
Currently, in addition to the reduction in permit length, MDEQ mandates row
crop producers to either install a sprinkler system (e.g. center pivot) or satisfy at least
three of eleven alternatives within the irrigation water management (IMP) practices

4

Mississippi Code Annotated §§51-3-1 through §§51-3-55 (2004).
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guideline.5 Within the IMP are ‘acceptable agricultural water efficiency practices’
criteria, and failure to meet these criteria results in rejecting the renewal of a well permit.
Several recent research publications by the current director of the Water Resource
Research Institute (WRRI), Dr. Jason Krutz, have demonstrated the economic gains at the
intensive margin and resource welfare that could be attained through implementation of
technologies such as soil moisture sensors, computerized hole selection (CHS) for furrow
irrigation, or surge valves (Beeson & Coblentz, 2014).
The main method of water application toward row crops is by furrow irrigation
because of the heavy clay soil which is prevalent in this region. With the Mississippi
Delta region as the setting, field studies have been conducted comparing different
irrigation techniques. Recently in a field study, Wood et al. (2017) compared this
region’s current main irrigation technique, conventional continuous flow furrow
irrigation (CONV), to an advanced irrigation technique known as ‘SURGE’ irrigation.6
They conclude that any additional installation costs of SURGE is offset by reduced water
application ranging from 22% – 80%. Additionally, their results indicate improved
irrigation water use efficiency (IWUE) of 29% while sustaining equivalent crop yield
relative to CONV.
However, recent irrigation technology research (e.g., Peterson & Ding, 2005;
Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014; Berbel & Mateos, 2014) have stated that advancements in irrigation

5

Refer to
https://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/pdf/L&W_MRVAConservationMethodMDEQApplicationOct16/$
File/MRVA%20Conservation%20Method%20MDEQ%20Application%20Oct%2016.pdf?OpenElement
for the complete list of ‘acceptable agricultural water efficiency practices for MRVA agricultural
groundwater withdrawal permits.’
6
‘SURGE’ irrigation improves the uniform distribution of furrow irrigation through irregular cycles or
intervals thus improving down furrow efficiency while also reducing deep percolation (Henry & Krutz,
2017)
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technology has increased groundwater withdrawals thus further depleting water levels in
aquifers. That is, decreasing the marginal cost of extraction may lead producers changing
toward a higher water intensive crop mix (Peterson & Ding, 2005; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014).
Therefore, technological advancements in irrigation efficiency may not mitigate the
depletion of the water level in the aquifer.
Although the intended outcome may not result, implementing these advancements
tend to be the most common, effective, and feasible policy prescription utilized to
encourage more efficient water resource management (Peterson & Ding, 2005; Pfeiffer &
Lin, 2014; Berbel & Mateos, 2014). Regulations that restrict groundwater extraction tend
to be expensive policy prescriptions, which may explain why regulatory agencies
incentivize adoption of technological advancements in irrigation. Therefore, to achieve
the regulator’s goal of increasing the ending water level of the aquifer, increases
irrigation efficiency must be coupled with reduced quantities of water extraction allowed
(Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014).
Furthermore, each permit sets a water use limit for various agricultural production
(Table 1.2). This is referred to in the economics literature as the intensive margin.
However, these limits are roughly twice that of recommended usage by normal
agricultural practices for any crop in the region (YMD, 2010). Taking the current
regulatory constraints on the number of well permits and use limits, it appears that
regulation thus far is non-binding on either the extensive or intensive margins.

11

Table 1.2

MDEQ Water Use Limits and Industry Recommendations for Major
Agricultural Commodities grown in Mississippi Delta

Agricultural Commodity

Water Use Limits
(acre/feet)

Recommended Water Use
(acre/feet)

Row Crops
(i.e. Soybeans and Corn)

1.5

0.8

Rice

3.0

2.5

Aquaculture

5.0

4.0

Aquaculture (Fingerlings)

7.0

5.3

Source: http://www.quickstats.nass.usda.gov
Initially at the start of 2014, MDEQ threatened to mandate metering of all
permitted wells in the Mississippi Delta. In response to the threat, an agreement with
farm groups resulted in 10% of all permitted wells in each county would be metered by
December 30, 2015.7 Those farmers who voluntarily meter their wells began selfreporting their water use February 1, 2016 and annually thereafter. Data from these
wells are intended to provide better information regarding the state and nature of the
aquifer. However, a large sample may be required to provide a relatively accurate ‘map’
of the complicated MRVAA’s hydrological flow dynamics, and hence better define
producers’ relative impacts on others and the aquifer as a whole.

7

http://www.deltafarmpress.com/blog/time-growing-short-voluntary-metering-deltairrigation-wells
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CHAPTER II
RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Problem Statement
There exists a tension between water sustainability and economic prosperity in a
commons property setting. It appears from the literature that there does not exist a
universal efficiency enhancing resource management policy for CPR’s. Current
regulatory policies on water use in the MRVAA has not stemmed the reduction in the
water levels, and the adoption of technology and farm practices may not generate the
desired result of reducing total water usage.
MDEQ has demonstrated a willingness to increase regulatory oversight in order to
address their main concern which is the aggregate state of the aquifer. A growing
concern among the major farm groups in Mississippi is the implementation of future
water use regulations (Mckee, 2011; Brandon, 2011). If adoption of technology and farm
practices do not stem the declines in the MRVAA, the next regulatory step may be to
reduce water usage and/or the number of well permits. However, regulation is likely to
be costly to effectively implement, due to strategic avoidance by those who are regulated.
Research Question
Before imposing a limited use regulation of a CPR, could regulators make use of
its threat to incentivize producers to reduce usage to avoid regulation?

13

Research Objective
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact on producer water
extraction behavior in a non-cooperative game under a credible threat of varying degrees
of future water use restrictions by an external regulatory body. To achieve the objective,
laboratory experiments are designed that incorporate three major characteristics of the
MRVAA, 1) CPR, 2) a directional hydrologic flow dynamic, and 3) heterogeneously
located (recharge endowed) producers.
Research Contributions
The main contributions of the research are both policy and academic relevant. In
regards to policy, if the threat is successful, then more sustainable usages could be
achieved without costly regulation. This study will be the first to characterize the
interrelationships between producers in MRVAA and identify the common pool dilemma
confronting Mississippi Delta producers and regulators. For instance, this is the first
setting applicable to shallow aquifers with significant flow dynamics, as well as
heterogeneously recharge endowed producers Also, the research provides the first
analysis of the relevant strategic issues of regulation in the Mississippi Delta region. For
instance, the research informs policy makers of the impacts on heterogeneous user
strategic behavior and the resulting aggregate impact on the sustainability of the MRVAA
given various degrees of symmetrically applied water restriction regulations.
In regards to the academic literature, this study either combines and/or extends
three dissimilar assumptions from previous CPR analyses by Gardner et al., 1997; Suter
et al., 2012; and Holt et al., 2012 within the conceptual model. Gardner et al. (1997)
assumes homogeneous producers and does not model recharge, Suter et al. (2012)
14

assumes homogeneous recharge rates in a spatially explicit model, and Holt et al. (2012)
analyzes a surface water setting in the form of a river. Also differing from previous
research, this study will analyze impacts on strategic decision making behaviors across
regulatory treatments within a spatially sequential groundwater extraction setting.
This study builds on the research Suter et al. (2012) conducted by incorporating a
natural recharge rate within the model pertinent when accounting for the MRVAA’s flow
dynamics. Not until recently have economists built more spatially realistic CPR models
examining spatial externalities created by sequential resource appropriation (Brozović et
al., 2006; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012; Suter et al., 2012). This study incorporates a similar
sequential resource appropriation framework to Holt et al. (2012) which is created by a
unidirectional flow in order to analyze changes to a producer’s strategic decision
behavior. This study contributes to the literature by modeling and conducting
experiments that incorporate this particular hydrologic flow dynamic for groundwater
extraction in aquifers similar to the MRVAA. The last contribution of this study is
evaluating changes in extraction behavior within treatments focusing on a symmetric
policy either imposing a proportional reduction or complete shutdown of groundwater
extraction.
Organization of this research begin with a review of relevant literature in regards
to externalities and institutional governance. A conceptual model is then developed that
incorporates aspects of relevant aquifer flow dynamics for the MRVAA and other
characteristics from scientific studies. Next, the experimental design is described. After
conducting each experimental treatment and gathering data, all the experimental results
are reported. Finally, conclusions will be drawn which address policy implications,
15

identify limitations of the current research, and provide a path for future research
extensions.

16

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Common pool resource (CPR) problems have been debated and studied for nearly
a century. The complexity encompassing the management of a CPR has led researchers
from multiple academic disciplines to address CPR dilemmas. Scott Gordon (1954)
made the first significant contribution explicitly toward CPR research by establishing the
first formal model of CPR appropriation analyzing the fishing industry. Gordon refuted
previous biological research that indicated market effects were enough to ensure an
ecosystem equilibrium. However less than a decade later, Garrett Hardin’s seminal work
states inefficient management of a renewable CPR by economically rational individuals
will result in total destruction of the resource (1968). He coins this extreme outcome as a
“Tragedy of the Commons.” More recently, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and her
collaborators concede while Hardin’s extremely pessimistic outcome is possible, it is not
only nor the most likely outcome in small-scale localized situations (1990; Walker et al.,
1990; Walker & Gardner, 1992; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993).
There exists a plethora of CPR research regarding efficient management of
groundwater irrigation systems, and table 2.1 provides the relevant literature for this
analysis. To begin to understand a CPR dilemma, Gardner et al. (1990) specified
necessary conditions that CPRs must satisfy before being classified as a CPR dilemma.
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The four conditions8 they specify are as follows: resource subtractability, multiple
producers, suboptimal outcome, and constitutional feasible alternatives. Much of the
groundwater research focuses on one of two following distinct problems created by CPR
dilemmas: appropriation or provision. Currently in the Delta region, the MRVAA
satisfies all necessary conditions9 to be categorized as a CPR dilemma. The remaining
relevant literature pertaining to this study will focus on spatial externalities and
institutional governance to establish how this study contributes toward progressing this
line of research.
Spatial Externalities
Within the field of economics, choices made by individuals or firms generate
externalities which economists generally categorize as either positive or negative.
Positive externalities occur when societal profit gains are greater than an individual’s
profit gains (e.g. technological advances in irrigation techniques result in increased water
use efficiency thus requiring less water to be extracted). However, negative externalities
resulting from an individual’s rational decisions create additional production costs
experienced by others (e.g. producer’s extraction of groundwater lowers available water
table level).

8

Resource subtractability is when the resource is extracted by an individual, the resource is not fully
available to all other individuals. Multiple producers implies more than one user of the resource. When
given aquifer characteristics, technology, rules, markets, and characteristics of producers that strategies of
the producers, from their perspective, result in suboptimal outcomes. Constitutionally feasible
alternatives indicate at least one feasible coordinated strategy exists resulting in higher efficiency than the
current decisions. (Gardner et al., 1990)
9
Satisfying only conditions 1 and 2 creates a CPR situation. In order to differentiate a dilemma from a
situation, a CPR must also satisfy conditions 3 and 4. (Gardner et al., 1990)
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Early groundwater analyses (e.g. Gisser & Sanchez, 1980) primarily utilize a
“single-cell aquifer” model or “bathtub” model which disregards the influence of the
spatial aspects as well as increases in production cost due to well location (Brozović et
al., 2010; Suter et al., 2012). Despite this simplification, it is generally agreed that these
types of models produce reasonably good estimates for small confined aquifers.
However, Brozović et al. (2010) state a “single-cell aquifer” model will underestimate the
magnitude of the groundwater externality around a well by several times or more when
analyzing large aquifers. Therefore, since the MRVAA is a large aquifer, a simple
“single-cell aquifer” model is not applicable.
Ever since scientists investigated rapid declining water levels primarily in
concentrated irrigation areas in the 1970’s, spatial externalities has been a contentious
issue (Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012). Currently, a growing number of groundwater research
utilize spatially explicit models. Although incorporating spatial externalities adds
another level of complexity to the model, this feature is more closely aligned with the real
world. Integrating specific aquifer characteristics, storativity and transmissivity, while
accounting for time and distance between wells controls for extraction impacts across
time and space (Brozović et al., 2010; Suter et al., 2012; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012).10,11
Previous literature also address congestion and stock externalities that exist
(Provencher & Burt, 1993; Gardner et al., 1997). Similar in nature to spatial
externalities, when well spacing reduce extraction efficiency, congestion externalities are

10

Storativity is the volume of water discharged from storage per unit surface are per unit decrease in the
hydraulic head (Brozović et al. 2010).
11
Transmissivity measures the rate at which groundwater flows through the saturated thickness of an
aquifer.
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observed in part to decreases in hydraulic head pressure stemming from a ‘cone of
depression.’12 A stock externality is realized by producers as the aquifer water table level
diminishes from extraction which increases extraction costs. Currently, producers in the
Mississippi Delta are experiencing both a congestion and stock externality reducing their
extraction efficiency which impact their independent strategic decision-making
behaviors.
Few previous studies model a unidirectional flow dynamic for surface water (i.e.
rivers) to capture the cumulative external cost experienced by downstream producers
(Ostrom & Gardner, 1993; Schnier, 2009; Holt et al., 2012). The unidirectional flow
directly impacts net benefits accrued and equity on the distribution of water, resulting in
heterogeneous outcomes based on locational advantages. Producers at the MRVAA’s
natural recharge entry point located at the northern end have incentive to extract at higher
rates because of the increased level of recharge received. Higher extraction rates result in
lower recharge allowed to flow downstream therefore, generating wider positional
inequity.
Institutional Governance
Currently, ongoing research debate as to whether self-governance or a centralized
governance authority (i.e. government regulatory agency) would result in the most
efficient management of CPRs. However, there exists differences among the studies
ranging from the type of aquifer modeled (single-cell, multi-cell, or spatially explicit),

12

Pumping efficiency lost due to wells located in too close of a proximity of one another (Gardner et al.
1997).
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type of framework describing the setting (competitive or cooperative), and assumptions
about producers.
Some previous studies tend to support the conclusion by Hardin (1968) that state
that only a central authority could avoid a ‘tragedy of the commons.’ Previous studies
have investigated efficiency gains from separate regulatory mechanisms where in the
absence of self-governance, an exogenous mechanism would improve resource
efficiency. For example, Holt et al. (2012) included analysis of alternative self-governing
mechanisms to measure efficiency gains, but a government imposed optimal tax
produced the most efficient outcome. Gardner et al. (1997) reported efficiency gains
from implementing entry restrictions and stock quotas within water law guidelines. This
experimental study supports the conclusions of Gardner et al. (1997) where increased
efficiency was achieved through a regulatory entity.
Some previous CPR research, however, support Ostrom’s view that feasible selfgoverning alternatives could be implemented to solve CPR dilemmas. From these
studies, researchers mainly discuss the following self-governing mechanisms:
communication (e.g. informal “chat” or bargaining13), establishing water markets, or selfsanctioning mechanisms. Holt et al. (2012) also concluded that exogenous intervention is
not required in some cases when effective mitigation of a CPR dilemma can be achieved
through informal social agreements. Therefore, feasible self-governing alternatives
incentivizing sustainable management of CPRs must be made on a case-by-case basis.

13

Holt et al. (2012) conducted experiments testing these self-governing mechanisms in addition to an
auction mechanism and an optimal fee.
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To begin, the relevant literature (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1992; Ostrom & Gardner,
1993; Provencher & Burt, 1993; Madani & Dinar, 2012) all recommend that selfgovernance would improve the efficiency water resource management. All of these
studies, however, model a single-cell aquifer. A single-cell aquifer would simplify the
model and be sufficient for small confined aquifers. However, as stated earlier in the
chapter by Brozović et al. (2010), modeling this type of aquifer would underestimate
relative impacts from externalities resulting in inefficient policies or self-governance
mechanisms. This study is dissimilar from previous literature and contributes to the
progression of research by not modelling a single-cell aquifer, but rather a particular type
of spatially explicit model.
Some literature (e.g., Gardner et al., 1997; Brozović et al., 2006; Madani & Dinar,
2012; Holt et al., 2012) recommends management from a central authority would
improve management efficiency. Out of these studies, Gardner et al. (1997) and
Brozović et al. (2006) assume homogeneous producers while Madani & Dinar (2012) and
Holt et al. (2012) both assume heterogeneous producers. Homogeneous producers may
have been assumed to simplify the model in order to derive solutions, but it lacks real
world realities. Madani & Dinar (2012) would only recommend a central authority if
caused by natural limitations. The research conducted by Herr et al. (2007) investigates
resource appropriation efficiency in a static and dynamic scenario. However, they did
find that imposing a stock quota has the highest probability of increasing societal welfare.
Other literature reviewed (e.g., Gisser & Sanchez, 1980; Walker & Gardner,
1992; Loáiciga, 2004; Brozović et al., 2010; Suter et al., 2012; and Pheiffer & Lin, 2012)
does not advocate either type of institutional governance. However, they each outline
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certain conditions that must be met in order for a policy or self-governance mechanism to
potentially increase management efficiency. These conditions include: policies or
localized management mechanisms must be strictly enforced, the best policies tend not to
be uniform or symmetric, and property rights that are inefficient or not clearly defined
and enforced may necessitate internalizing externalities. However, Ostrom et al.
concludes no universal solution exists that can be applied to every CPR dilemma which
she attributes to heterogeneity, in both resource characteristics and resource producers
(1999). Therefore, there is not an institutional governance mechanism that can be applied
universally nor toward the MRVAA.
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Focus

Whether
optimal control
or no control
solutions derive
enough of a
difference to
warrant a
specific control
mechanism.

Presents a
conceptual
framework for
analyzing
behavioral
problems
occurring in
CPRs.

Competition
Versus
Optimal
Control in
Groundwater
Pumping
Gisser &
Sanchez
(1980)

The Nature of
CommonPool Resource
Problems
Gardner,
Ostrom,
Walker
(1990)

Described the four necessary
conditions (resource
subtractability, multiple
producers, suboptimal outcomes,
constitutionally feasible
alternatives) producing a CPR
dilemma. Also laid out a structure
for classifying CPR dilemmas
caused by either an appropriation,
(i.e. rent dissipation) or changing
assumptions regarding assignment
or technological externalities, or
provisional problems.

Utilize model developed by Gisser
& Mercado (1973) incorporating a
deterministic setting of discrete
time in a non-cooperative
framework. Assumes
homogeneous producers
extracting from a single-cell
aquifer of infinite stock and
constant recharge.

Modeling Framework Elements

Chronological order of relevant literature

Literature

Table 3.1

Results from a
case study (Sri
Lankan Fishery)
and a laboratory
experiment
indicate that with
limiting
appropriation of
the CPR, rent
dissipation occurs.

Optimal control
and no-control
strategies
performed equally
well resulting in
negligible
difference when
the aquifer storage
is large.

Results

Neither

Neither

Recommended
Institutional
Management

Do acknowledge
that forms of
communication
and localized
rules may either
prevent or
significantly
reduce rent
dissipation.

Specific
assumptions of
this study implies
optimal control
does not increase
producers’
welfare gains.

Policy or SelfGovernance
Implications
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Evaluated
decision-makers’
behavioral
responses through
a CPR
experiment.

Investigated
whether or not a
self-governing
mechanism of
established
covenants through
communication,
with or without
sanctions, may
solve CPR
dilemmas.

Probabilistic
Destruction of
CPRs:
Experimental
Evidence
Walker &
Gardner
(1992)

Covenants
with and
without a
sword: Selfgovernance is
possible
Ostrom,
Walker,
Gardner
(1992)

Table 3.1 (continued)

Developed a discrete time
single-cell model for the
four laboratory treatments.
Players were homogeneous
in payoff function with
identical endowments.
Utilized a non-cooperative
framework in the baseline
treatment while the other
three treatments employed a
cooperative framework.

Developed a symmetric
non-cooperative game, void
of institutions incentivizing
cooperative behavior, of
homogeneous producers
within a single-cell aquifer
setting. Derived Nash and
sub-game perfect
equilibriums through
dynamic programming.
Communication
alone increase net
yields, sanctioning
alone decrease net
yields, and both
communication
with sanctioning
increase net yields
significantly.
Allowing producers
to choose which
sanctions to
implement achieve
highest net yield.

Although
establishing a Nash
equilibrium as a
focal point which
remains in the “safe
zone” and generates
near optimal rents,
experimental
subjects do not
reach this
equilibrium.
Self-Governance

Neither

Implementing selfgovernance
management
mechanisms of
covenants
(communication),
swords
(sanctioning), and
covenants with a
sword
(communication
with potential selfsanctioning)

Potential policy
prescription of
requiring an
environmental
bond the size of
the steady-state
value could help
subjects focus on
staying within the
“safe zone.”
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The
Externalities
Associated with
the Common
Property
Exploitation of
Groundwater
Provencher &
Burt
(1993)

Addressed optimal
exploitation of
groundwater under
uncertain
conditions and risk
preferences while
acknowledging
externalities
resulting within
common property
groundwater
extraction. Present
different regimes
to mitigate these
externalities.

Table 3.1 (continued)
Modeled a
deterministic hydroeconomic system of
homogeneous
producers extracting
identical amounts of
groundwater in
discrete time.
Although a single-cell
aquifer is modeled,
recharge is accrued
from surface water.
Analyzed sequence of
time-dependent
optimal decision rules
for the individual firm
and social planner’s
optimal management
decision plan.

Identification and
analysis of
externalities when
exploiting
groundwater
progresses more
efficient strategies
for optimal
groundwater
management.
Stochastic and
deterministic
settings generate
different results by
eliminating the
risk externality.

Self-Governance

Establishing a private
property rights regime
eliminates the stock
externality and reduce
the cost of the risk
externality.
Identifying and
accounting for
externalities impacts
appropriate changes
for groundwater
management. Without
information about
individual risk
preferences, regulatory
policies, pumping
taxes and quotas, will
only recover part of
the potential benefit
lost.
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Governing a
Groundwater
Commons: a
Strategic and Lab
analysis of western
water law
Gardner, Moore,
Walker
(1997)

Table 3.1 (continued)
Evaluated
empirically a
modeling
framework
developed for
managing a
groundwater CPR
based on the
differing western
states’ water laws.

Developed a non-cooperative
model where homogeneous
producers with stationary
benefit functions drill wells
to reach water table and then
follow water levels as they
decline. Utilized dynamic
programming to solve
discrete time equations of
different central restrictive
policies.

After comparing
baseline, entry
limit, and stock
quota back to the
derived optimum
and SPNE,
resulted in the
lowest path
efficiency
occurring in the
baseline, then the
entry limit, and the
stock quota had
the highest path
efficiency average.

Central
Water laws of
Authoritative absolute
Management ownership and
prior
appropriation
should restrict
entry (max 5)
while correlative
rights should
implement a stock
quota.
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Analytical game—
theoretical
approach to
groundwater
extraction
Loáiciga, Hugo
(2004)

Table 3.1 (continued)
Developed a
game theoretic
approach to
calculate
sustainable
groundwater
extraction rates.

Modeled both cooperative
and non-cooperative
framework to derive
sustainable extraction
rates. Assumed
heterogeneity of
producers’ water levels,
no recharge, discounting,
and long planning horizon
(i.e. 100 years) in discrete
time. Utilized
hydrological expressions
that consider aquifer
characteristics of
transmissivity and
storativity.

Non-cooperation
leads to over
extraction due to the
CC-PP (commonized
costs – privatized
profits) Paradox. To
ensure cooperation is
efficient in the long
run, enforcement
must be effective.
Does acknowledge in
order to achieve a
cooperative solution
that each producer
needs to maximize
their revenues which
would then maximize
aggregate net
revenues for all
producers.

Neither

State that without
strict enforceability,
policies or localized
management
mechanisms will
not achieve
sustainable
management. (e.g.,
implementing court
adjudicated water
rights or
prescriptions for
beneficial water
usage)
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Optimal Mgt. of
Groundwater over
Space and Time
Brozović,
Sunding,
Zilberman
(2006)

Table 3.1 (continued)
Emphasis on
tradeoffs
between each
user’s private
property right,
physical
parameters of the
resource, and
spatial and
temporal
distribution of
extraction across
time and space.

Presented a noncooperative path
dependent
groundwater
extraction model
accounting for
spatial heterogeneity
of a single-cell, twocell, and multi-cell
aquifers in discrete
time. Each producer
is homogeneous by
having identical net
benefit functions of
water.

As distance increases from
neighboring wells, optimal
extraction rates increase due
to spatial interdependency
as well as time lags
impacting rival extraction
rates. An aquifer’s
hydrological characteristics,
transmissivity and
storativity, impact optimal
management strategies (e.g.
single-cell aquifers have
higher gains with low
storativity and high
transmissivity). There were
non-significant welfare
differences between optimal
control and competitive
outcomes.

Central
States optimal
Authoritative policies must
Management adjust to the
degree of nonuniformity.
Spatial uniform
policies are only
optimal when an
infinite number of
wells are
uniformly
distributed over
the aquifer.

30

On the spatial
nature of the
groundwater
pumping
externality
Brozović,
Sunding,
Zilberman
(2010)

Focus on an
economic model of
groundwater
management that
accounts for spatial
dynamic
groundwater flow
equations.
Calibrated their
model to better
estimate the
resulting magnitude
of groundwater
extraction
externality in
spatially explicit
models.

Table 3.1 (continued)
Developed a noncooperative model in
discrete time that
incorporates the spatial
nature of the
groundwater extraction
externality by utilizing
spatially explicit
groundwater flow
equations accounting for
space and time.
Although each producer
has identical benefit
functions, their depth to
water is heterogeneous
impacting extraction
costs and ending benefits
accrued. Model does
assumes no uncertainty.

Need to account for
aquifer characteristics
(size, confined or
unconfined) and well
placement from rivals
in order to derive
optimal management
practices or policy
implications from
model results. Singlecell models are
adequate for small
confined aquifer, but
spatially explicit
models should be
utilized when studying
large unconfined
aquifers to not
underestimate the
marginal extraction
externality.

Neither

Depending on if the
extraction externality is
spatially variable and
well locations relative
to one another, then the
best regulation would
have to be spatially
variable and wellspecific. A binding
uniform extraction
quota may lead to
uniform extraction
rates, but differing
spatial marginal
product of water in
each location.
Extension of this
research would be to
analyze welfare gains
from alternative
management utilizing a
spatially explicit model
to better propose
potential future
policies.
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Noncooperative
institutions for
sustainable CPR
management:
Application to
groundwater
Madani &
Dinar
(2012)

Applied
mathematical
formulations
that better
represent
strategic nature
of producer
behavior and
hydro-geologic
characteristics
of the aquifer to
analyze the long
term effects of
various CPR
management
institutions
while still
preserving the
resource.

Table 3.1 (continued)
Utilized the model
developed by Loaiciga
(2004). This model has
a non-cooperative
framework in discrete
time of two
heterogeneous
producers incorporating
the extraction cost
externality. Although
essentially a single-cell
aquifer with a known
constant recharge,
water levels differ by
accounting for “cone of
depression” resulting
from extraction.

From a numerical
example, different
non-cooperative
management
strategies tested
the overall profit
accrued within the
time horizon.
Most CPR
producers will
employ strategies
between the two
extremes, ignorant
myopic and smart
non-myopic
management
strategies

Self-Governance &
Central
Authoritative
Management
(existing caveats
for central
authority)

To improve
individual welfare,
after employing their
respective
management strategy,
self-governing
alternatives (for
larger group of
producers) would
include
communication,
education, and
government
incentives. Central
authority would be
utilized when caused
by natural limitations,
but policies must be
feasible. These
uniform policies
would include
drawdown
(extraction) penalty,
revenue penalty, or
limits on extraction
quotas.
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Groundwater
pumping and
spatial
externalities
in agriculture
Pfeiffer &
Lin
(2012)

Behavior in a
Spatially
Explicit
Groundwater
Resource:
Evidence
from the Lab
Suter et. al
(2012)

Emphasis on utilizing
spatially explicit
models that include
spatial effects of
extraction that will
alter results derived
from single-cell
models. Conducted
CPR experiments to
derive impacts on the
predicted pumping
rates and behavior if
producers from
different modeling
frameworks.
Objective was to
empirically estimate
from a field
experiment in Kansas
the degree of impact
of extraction behavior
interactions between
neighboring rival
producers from the
perspective of social
planner and for each
individual producer.

Table 3.1 (continued)
Developed four separate
models with non-cooperative
framework in discrete time.
Two were single-cell models
where one impacted all
producers and the other only
impacted the individual.
Producers were
homogeneous in this model.
Two spatially explicit
models were constructed
where the producers were
heterogeneous in spatial
effects impacting the water
depth.
Abstracted a spatial
framework from a
hydrological model
employing an equation of
motion to estimate change in
stock levels. From the
framework, the numerical
programming assumes a
single-cell aquifer of
homogeneous plots of land in
both the social planner and
for each individual dynamic
optimizing producer.

Different
hydrological
models will alter
the results based
on the model
assumptions.
Extraction rates,
extraction
strategies, and
ending social
efficiency all
differ in results
when analyzed
in each separate
model.
An individual
producer would
extract more
water than a
social planner
would allow
because of the
strategic
interaction
between
neighboring rival
producers leads
to over
extraction.
Neither

Neither

Property rights may be
inaccurate and/or
inefficient resulting from
spatial movement of
groundwater. Either
consolidating neighboring
lands or wells will
internalize the externality
or must implement
minimum well spacing
requirements in areas of
high well density.

This research has a narrow
focus on the extraction
rates and strategies that
ultimately impact what is
important to producers,
social efficiency.
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Water
Externalities:
Tragedy of the
Common Canal
Holt, Johnson,
Mallow,
Sullivan
(2012)

Focused on
allocation
inefficiencies
created by a
unidirectional flow
from a fixed supply
of the resource
(surface water from
a canal). Emphasis
on multiple selfgoverning
mechanisms and one
regulatory policy.
Generated internal
validity through a
laboratory
experiment.

Table 3.1 (continued)
Although a specified
economic model was
not developed, the
model consisted of a
non-cooperative
spatial framework in
discrete time.
Producers were
heterogeneous in
location resulting
from the assumption
of a uni-directional
surface water flow.

After establishing a
baseline treatment,
each proposed solution
improved the efficiency
level. The regulatory
policy, an exogenous
optimal fee resulted in
the highest efficiency
level. Of the selfgoverning mechanisms:
auctions, binding
bilateral bargaining,
and non-binding
communication
resulted in insignificant
differences.

Central
The exogenous
Authoritative uniform policy of an
Management optimal fee generates
the highest efficiency
by fully internalizing
extraction
externalities. Other
alternative selfgoverning
mechanisms besides
the options analyzed
are: extraction
restrictions or usage
fees implemented by
producers casting
votes or upstream
producers
compensating
downstream
producers.

CHAPTER IV
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The objective of developing the following conceptual model is to guide the
information and payoff structure for the laboratory experiments. Though MDEQ has
continued to increase the number of well permits, the modeling framework holds the
number of well constant, thus ignoring user decisions regarding the extensive margin. As
a result, the only user decisions are in regards to the intensive margin. User decisions are
also restricted to a single output, thus alternative crop selection is ignored.
Previous research conducted by Gardner et al. (1997), Loáiciga (2004), and
Archetti (2009) model their marginal pumping cost with their cost function from an
output perspective. These researchers assume individual producers experience increasing
marginal pumping costs as a result of continually drilling deeper as water levels decline.
While appropriate for analyzing deep aquifers such as the Ogallala aquifer, the
Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer (MRVAA) is a shallow aquifer and producers
are assumed to initially drill their wells to the maximum depth. This study will capture
marginal pumping costs of extraction from an input perspective within the production
function. Since all producers of the aquifer are at a ‘roughly’ symmetric depth, marginal
factor costs of pumping are assumed symmetric and constant as water levels decline.
In regards to aquifer recharge, deep aquifers, such as the Ogallala, may take
thousands of years to replenish water levels even if extraction ceased (Ponce, 2006).
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However, shallow aquifers located close to surface water sources, such as the MRVAA,
has the capability to recharge in a shorter time frame, possibly years (Ponce, 2006).
Archetti (2009), Gardner et al. (1997), and Loáiciga (2004) all assume symmetric
recharge to simplify their models in order to identify strategic behavior or other pertinent
features of the model. However, recharge rates are likely not symmetric due to
underground hydraulic conductivity and the location of a well in relation to recharge
sources and rival extraction (Ponce, 2006; YMD, 2006; Coupe et al., 2012). Because of
the heterogeneity of producers based on their locations along the groundwater flow
dynamics of the MRVAA, this research models asymmetric recharge rates due to
negative externalities from extraction by upstream rival producers.
Generalized Model Development
To begin, it is assumed that i  [1,..., N ] producers have symmetric water
extraction technology and a fixed numeraire number of wells of one. Therefore, the
number of producers equals the number of wells. The competitive ith producer’s T period
profit function can be generally defined as
T

max  it    Po f  wit , I   Cit  wit , I | Sit  dt .
wit

(4.1)

0

In equation (4.1), Po is the output price of the crop. The function f  wit , I  is the ith
producer’s current period’s output where wit represents the producer’s current period
water extraction applied entirely to crop production, and a vector of other numeraire
inputs I . For simplicity it is assumed factors of production are applied in fixed
proportions. A classic assumption of competitive firms is that for a unique profit
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maximization to exist, the firm must experience diminishing returns in production, thus

f '  wit   0 and f ''  wit   0 . This assumption is supported by Barrett and Skogerboe
(1980) and Kranz et al. (2008) who have demonstrated there exists a ‘maximum
allowable amount of water’ in order to maximize yields. Furthermore, any water
application past this threshold will decrease total yields (drowning out) resulting from
potential leaching of nutrients which inhibits soil aeration.
The second term in equation (4.1), Cit  wit , I | Sit  , is the ith producer’s current
period’s total input costs of production, conditional on the water (stock) level Sit . The
marginal factor costs for a competitive firm are C '  wit   0 and C ''  wit   0 . Therefore,
if Sit diminishes over time, the cost of extraction increases and will be discussed
explicitly below.
Explicit functional forms used in the experiment are now introduced that satisfy
the general conditions previously identified. The profit for any given producer in any
given period is represented as





 

 it  Po x  bwit  a  wit 2   wit  Pe 1  S  Sit








 f .



(4.2)

  , where

In equation (4.2), the ith producer’s total revenue function is, Po x  bwit  a wit 2

x is the producer’s dryland output yield. To insure diminishing returns in production, a
and b are positive shape parameters.
The ith producer’s total cost of production is defined as

 

wit  Pe 1  S  Sit
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where Pe is the constant price of energy needed to lift groundwater per foot,

 

1  S  Sit





identifies a positive water price adjustment factor as water level decline,

and f represents the costs of dry land production. The water price adjustment factor
accounts for the loss of hydraulic head pressure as water levels decline, thus requiring
more energy to lift the water. The motivation to include the water price adjustment factor
originated from Brozović et al. (2009) and Suter et al. (2012) whose spatially explicit
models incorporated storativity of an aquifer to account for changes in the hydraulic head
pressure. The rate at which extraction cost increases is determined by  . If   1 , this
results in the marginal factor cost increasing at an increasing rate as Sit decreases. If

  1 , this results in the marginal factor cost increasing at an decreasing rate as Sit
decreases. If   1 , this results in a constant marginal factor cost as Sit decreases. For
this analysis,   1 and marginal factor costs are constant. Finnally, the producer’s
water extraction possibilities in any given period t is bounded set Sit [S i , S i ] where S i
is the maximum threshold of the aquifer and is assumed symmetric for all producers.
Because extraction may exceed recharge rates, water levels may change over
time. To specify the hydrological dynamics of stock levels, the equation of motion is
generally represented as
Sit   wit  git  w jt  .
o

(4.3)

In equation (4.3), the changes in the stock level is a function of the ith producer’s
extraction rate relative to the recharge rate, gi  w jt  at time t, which is a function of i  j
other producer’s extraction rates. The externality created in (3) modifies Pheiffer & Lin’s
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(2012) generalized equation of motion, however, unlike those authors’ model, recharge
flow dynamics are dependent on upstream producer extractions and do not account for
recharge gained from percolation. Holt et al. (2012) assumes a surface water setting
where downstream producers observe the amount of recharge received after upstream
extractions. In an aquifer setting, however, producers make simultaneous decisions and
cannot directly observe recharge. Therefore, downstream producers form beliefs about
their recharge subject to their beliefs of upstream rival extraction decisions.
If the aquifer has a directional flow, then the ith producer’s recharge rate that
include negative externalities from upstream extraction can be explicitly defined as
gi  w jt     

j i 1
j 1

 w jt
dij

i j

,

(4.4)

gi  wit     i  1

where location is a one to one correspondence with the ith producer. A further
designation is that the jth producers are only those located in the upper gradient flow of
the aquifer relative to the ith producer. In (4.4),  is the aquifer’s maximum inflow of
natural recharge, assumed to exist at only in the upper end of the aquifer. This would be
the northern end of the MRVAA and is represented as i  1 designating the first in line to
receive recharge, and has no up gradient producers. The second expression in equation
(4.4) is the cumulative effect on down gradient producers’ recharge rates as a function of
the extraction of all upper gradient producers. The numerator,  w jt , is the multiple of
the maximum inflow of natural recharge, an assumed symmetric constant recharge factor,
0    1 , and each of j upper gradient producer extraction rates. The recharge factor

allows for some degree of perpendicular seepage unobstructed by upper gradient
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extraction. This mimics recharge available from parallel river systems. If at least one

w jt  0 the recharge received by the ith down gradient producer decreases. The
denominator, d ij , is the distance between the jth and ith producer’s locations. Therefore,
i’s immediate upper gradient neighbor has the greatest negative impact on the ith
producer’s recharge rate and is consistent with neighboring impacts as in Brozović et al.,
2010; Suter et al., 2012; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012. However, it is assumed that the gradient
flow (pressure) is sufficiently powerful to result in only an ordered effect in this model.
Taken together, recharge rates for all producers are heterogeneous, whereby the greatest
recharge is at the upper end of the gradient and the least at the tail end. All else equal,
water levels decline faster the further an producer is from the recharge source.
The current value Hamiltonian representation of the competitive producer’s
problem from utilizing equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) can be explicitly defined as

 

 - f - 



j i -1  w jt
- wit   i  j
  -  j 1

dij



 

 - f - 

 - wit   i  1 .

max H  Po  x  bwit - awit2  - wit Pe 1  S - Sit
wit

and

max H  Po  x  bwit - awit2  - wit Pe 1  S - Sit
wit

it

it

(4.5)
In equation (4.5), it represents the costate variable or shadow price of depleting
groundwater. Unlike Gardner et al. (1997) and Suter et al. (2012), there are no game
theoretic issues to contend with in this setting as down gradient producer decisions do not
impact upper gradient producers. Solutions for each producer is a recursive process
starting with i  1 .
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Characterizing the solutions for (4.5) are as follows. If it is the case that

  w1t 1* and a subset of k  i  j where   

j ik 1
j 1

 w jt 0
dij

o

 wkt 1* , then S1t  0  t

o

and S kt  0  kt resulting in 1t  0  1t and kt  0  kt , then the problem degenerates
to a simple non-dynamic profit maximization for those particular producers. For those
o

whose in (4.5) where it is the case that wit *  gi (wjt )  i  kt , then Si  kt  0  it and

i kt  0  it and the problem is dynamic. A steady state at time period t is reached for
these producers if and when wit *  gi (wjt )  i  k , t  t  .
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experimental design addresses the MRVAA by controlling for two of its
major attributes. The first attribute is the unidirectional flow of the aquifer. The second
attribute accounts for asymmetric endowment relative to the producer’s location.
The experimental design is a discrete approximation of the conceptual decision
model represented in equations (4.5). Parameterization of the conceptual model depicted
in equation (4.5) for the laboratory experimental design is depicted in table 5.1.
Table 5.1

Experimental Parameters to equations 4.5.

Parameter

Parameter Description

Parameter Value

T

Time Horizon

50

Po

Output price

1

x

1,000

b

Minimum output yield
(Dryland returns)
Positive shape parameter

a

Positive shape parameter

1,000

Pe

Price of energy

1
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49.95

Table 5.1 (Continued)
Parameter

Parameter Description

Parameter Value

S

100 feet

f

Aquifer’s maximum
threshold of water
Fixed costs



Maximum natural recharge

10



Symmetric recharge factor

0.015

250

The resulting Hamiltonians relevant to experimental subject are as follows:



j i 1 10  0.015  w jt
 wit 
max H  11000   49.95  wit  1000  wit2   wit 1000 1  100  Sit    250  it 10  



j
1
wit
dij


and
max H  11000   49.95  w1t  1000  w12t   w1t 1000 1  100  S1t    250  1t 10  w1t  .
w1t

(5.1)
Parameter values were chosen such that a one-shot first period profit maximizing
extraction rate for position 1 is w1t  10 . Because the maximum natural recharge rate is

  10  w1t results in w1t *  10  t . Therefore, location 1 would extract at this rate
throughout T. Because this will be true for all down gradient producer extraction
decisions, location 1 provides the baseline comparison for all other producer extraction
decisions. Because each session in the following experiment requires less than one hour
to observe 50 extraction decisions, no controls for subject discounting are measured.
The experiment in this study examines the decisions of six producers across three
policy treatments. Each treatment is replicated six times. Therefore, a total of 108
42

subjects were recruited from a pool of Mississippi State University undergraduate and
graduate students through email lists, flyers, and personal invitations.14 All sessions were
conducted in the Department of Agricultural Economics Experimental Teaching
Laboratory and did not last more than one hour.
Upon arrival at the experimental lab, each subject voluntarily gave consent toward
their experimental participation as well as given a hard copy of the experimental
instructions. Refer to Figure A.6 in Appendix A to view the experimental instructions
that was given to each subject which was also read aloud by the moderator. Subjects
were randomly grouped and randomly assigned a location from 1 to 6 within their
respective grouping.
Subjects interacted with a computer programmed using z-Tree game development
software (Fischbacher, 2007) when making extraction decisions. A historical report (see
Figure 5.1) constantly updates all producers’ extraction decisions and resulting relative
impacts (recharge rate, remaining available water level, per period earnings, and a
running tally of period earnings) after each production period. Subjects were free to
choose any extraction rate ranging from 0 to 10, the profit maximizing extraction rate for
location 1. However, if subjects choose an extraction rate higher than available water
within any period, their choice was truncated to the remaining available water level till
the end of the time horizon.

14

Subject pool came from the following departments: Agricultural Economics, Agronomy, Forestry,
Wildlife Fisheries & Aquaculture, Economics, and Finance.
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There was a sixty second time limit to submit extraction choices. Subjects were
informed that choosing 0 will result in the minimum output yield (dryland returns) of
1,000 tokens while choosing 10, the maximum allowable extraction will result in the
maximum output yield of 6,005 tokens. If an extraction decision has not been submitted
by the allotted time, the program entered an extraction decision of 0 for that respective
time period. If extraction exceeded the available water level in any respective production
period, the program entered the extraction of the available water level. Advancement to
the next period occurred once all extraction decisions have been made prior to the
established time limit allows for sessions to be conducted efficiently. All experimental
sessions concluded when each subject within their group had made extraction decisions
for the entire time horizon.
The role of each experimental subject was that of a producer who decides on the
quantity of water to extract for application toward their output within each production
period. Subjects were informed of the following information. First, the difference
between the total value of the output and total costs of production determine each
producer’s per period earnings. These per period earnings are impacted by that
producer’s water extraction rate, the water extraction rates of the upstream producer(s),
and the history of all producers’ extraction. At the beginning of each session, subjects
engage in 5 practice periods to familiarize themselves with the program dynamics. After
answering questions, subjects engaged in 50 production periods.
Subjects were informed about the aquifer’s dynamics. Because an inverse
relationship exists between extraction rates and water levels, the change in water level
depends on the difference between the amount extracted and recharge gained. Recharge
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received, either from the side or from the assumed flow dynamics, will mitigate the rate
at which the water levels decline. The producer in location 1 receives the maximum
allowable recharge of 10 feet because the ordered recharge flow begins in location 1, then
proceeds downstream to location 6.
Subjects were informed of the cost dynamics. When extraction is greater than the
recharge, water level necessarily declines, however, when recharge is greater than the
water extracted water levels will increase. When water levels decline, the required energy
to lift the groundwater increases because of the loss of hydraulic head pressure, thus
increasing marginal factor costs. Therefore, when extraction costs increase, due to
lowered water levels, producer profit necessarily declines across periods relative to
revenues across periods.
Subjects were informed about the impacts on revenue from their extraction
decisions. The total earnings for each subject in the experiment equaled the sum of the
payoffs accrued from each production period and recorded as a fictitious currency called
“tokens.” The amount in dollars paid out to each subject was calculated by applying a
disclosed exchange rate of 0.0001 to the sum of tokens earned by subjects within the
session. Average payoffs across all treatments ranged from $20 to $30 in addition to a $5
show-up payment.
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Experimental Treatments
Each experimental treatment was a different symmetric regulatory policy: noregulation, limited-use, and moratorium. The no-regulation treatment provides the
experimental baseline in the limited-use regulation treatment, where the restriction is
triggered when half of the producers’ current period stock levels reach or fall below the
critically low water level of 5.55 feet. This critically low water level was derived from
parameterized simulations where 5.55 feet is the steady state extraction rate for location
6, the furthest location that represents producers in Sunflower County. Therefore, all
producers with remaining water levels above the established critically low stock level,
will be forced to decrease maximum allowable pumping rates to 5.55 feet.
In the limited-use treatment, there exists a credible threat to enact the regulation
which is a function of the regulator’s (experimenter) authority. Triggering the limiteduse regulation that restricts the allowable extraction rate to 5.55 feet significantly impacts
both per period profits and the cumulative profits. When the maximum allowable
extraction rate has been reduced utilizing the model parameters, results in w6t

 g 6t  w jt 

which is a steady state for the furthest down gradient producer. Therefore, when the
limited-use regulation is enacted, all producers’ reduced extraction rates will result in the
aquifer replenishing itself gradually over time.
Theoretic predictions of the payoff function utilizing the model parameters within
the limited-use treatment beginning in t  1 , resulted in the maximum possible per period
profit to be 4,759 tokens. This is 986 tokens less than the one period profit maximum.
The reduced maximum allowable extraction rate in each period for all producers
throughout the entire time horizon will result in the maximum potential cumulative profit
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to be reduced from 287,250 to 237,970 tokens. Therefore, the aquifer remains at the
maximum threshold although per period and cumulative profits have been reduced.
In moratorium treatment, the trigger point is the same but the threat is more
severe than the limited-use regulation. Under a moratorium, all individuals discontinue
extraction and revert to dryland practices where the minimum revenue of 1,000 tokens is
accrued. After fixed costs of 250 tokens is subtracted from the revenue, the resulting
dryland practices earned profit is 750 tokens.
Due to the restrictive assumptions of the flow dynamics and heterogeneous
locations of producers, there are no game theoretic interdependencies in the no-regulation
treatment. However, in the limited-use and moratorium treatments, all subject extraction
decisions are interdependent, thus creating a game where one did not exist prior to
regulation. Therefore, the advantageous locations, near the recharge entry point, are now
interdependent on those disadvantageous locations through the credible threat of
regulation.
Within each treatment, the experimental design creates a competitive setting
among six heterogeneously located subjects. The experimental design for the regulatory
treatments intend to examine whether regulations incentivize changes in extraction
behavior provide insight to whether regulations impact those changes through either a
location effect or a treatment effect. Any observed significant changes in extraction
behavior across locations along the directional recharge flow results in a location effect.
Within each regulatory treatment, any significant changes in observed extraction rates
through interdependencies of each producer along the recharge flow dynamic results in a
treatment effect.
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Time

My
My
Extraction Recharge

Other Producers' Extraction

My
Water
Level

Per Period
Earnings

Cumulative
Earnings

t

e 1t

e 2t

e 3t

e 4t

e 5t

e 6t

g 6 (e jt )

S 6t

π6t

Σπ 6 t

1
2
3
4
5

10
1.5
3.6
4.2
7.2

10
1.5
3.6
4.9
8.4

10
1.5
3.6
5.3
8.7

10
1.5
3.6
6.4
9.3

10
1.5
3.6
8.9
9.7

10
10
8.7
9.4
7.9

6.58
9.49
8.77
7.61
6.88

91.79
89.66
82.92
73.51
64.36

5662.92
5641.62
5511.95
5478.03
5243.15

5662.92
11304.53
16816.49
22294.52
27537.67

Extraction Choice:

OK
Figure 5.1

Example of the experimental extraction choice screen for position 6
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Experimental Propositions
The purpose of the experimental treatments is to analyze how threatened
regulatory policies, differing in degrees of severity, impact extraction rate decisions,
ending water stocks and cumulative producer earnings. Three regulatory propositions are
tested.
Proposition 1: The threat of imposing future water usage restrictions based on a
degraded aquifer reduces water use, more so for more severe threats. Additionally,
heterogeneously located (endowed) producers respond differently depending on the
threatened regulatory policy.
Proposition 2: The threat of imposing future water usage restrictions based on a
degraded aquifer increases ending aquifer water stocks, more so for more severe threats.
Additionally, heterogeneously located (endowed) producers’ ending water stocks are
different depending on the threatened regulatory policy.
Proposition 3: The threat of imposing future water usage restrictions based on a
degraded aquifer decreases cumulative earnings, more so for more severe threats.
Additionally, heterogeneously located (endowed) producers ending water stocks are
different depending on the threatened regulatory policy.
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CHAPTER VI
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis first addresses Proposition 1, in regards to extraction
decisions. The extraction data collected from the experiment are time series crosssectional observations. The cross sections are a combination of treatment and location.
The extraction model to be estimated is
N 1

T 1

 N 1T 1

i 1

T 1

s 1

wit     i xit   T xT 



 s s  d t   it ,

(6.1)

where wi ,t is the dependent variable measuring the average extraction rate from the six
replications of each treatment for the ith location and tth time period. Averaging within
treatment replications mitigates individual subject idiosyncrasies allowing for a stronger
comparison across treatments and locations.
In equation (6.1), the parameter  is the intercept that represents the basis of
comparison (no-regulation treatment for location 1). The notation,

N 1

 x
i 1

fixed effects of locations 2 – 6. The notation,

T 1


T 1

T

, represents

xiT , represents the fixed effects of
 N 1T 1

implementing the two regulatory treatments. The notation,


s 1

fixed effects of interacting location by each regulatory treatment.
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i it

 s  s represents the

The notation,  d t , accounts for the time trend in the data. Finally, since this experimental
design consists of time series cross-sectional data, the errors,  i ,t , are expected to be
heteroskedastic, contemporaneously correlated, and autoregressive.
Given the time series cross-sectional attributes of the data, the Parks method is
employed to account for these disturbance contingencies (Parks, 1967). The Parks
method assumes a first-order autoregressive error structure and contemporaneous
correlation exists between cross sections. This method requires balanced observations
between cross sections and the number of cross sections to be less than the number of
observations. Given there are 19 cross sections and 50 observations per cross section, the
data satisfies a balanced panel property requirements of the method.
In regards to Proposition 1’s heterogeneous extraction responses, any significant
differences in extraction rates are a result of average learning over time by updating
beliefs about average rival choices. Wald tests were conducted testing pairwise
extraction parameter estimates across locations for the no-regulation, limited-use, and
moratorium treatments. Utilizing Wald tests allow for simultaneously testing multiple
parameter estimates within the econometric model. Results from the Wald test provide
additional insight as to whether heterogeneous locations significantly adjust extraction
behavior, a location effect, or from a symmetric regulatory policy, a treatment effect.
Finally, regression analysis will not be required for testing Propositions 2
regarding aggregate ending state of the aquifer or Proposition 3 regarding cumulative
profits. Because cumulative results are a simply mathematical aggregation of all
subjects’ ending water level, t-tests were conducted to test Propositions 2 and 3.
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CHAPTER VII
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experimental results will report observations across each treatment for
extraction rate behavior, aggregate ending water levels, and aggregate cumulative profits.
Locational extraction rate and water level paths are graphically depicted across the entire
time horizon for each treatment. By averaging across replications of individual subjects,
any path variabilities in extraction rate behaviors and water levels within treatments is a
result of a location effect while path variabilities within locations is a result of a treatment
effect.
Extraction Rate Analysis
Treatment Extraction Path Effects
Extraction rate is the only choice variable in this experiment. Extraction rate
governs the direct and indirect impacts on other relevant variables especially for
downstream locations. Figures 7.1 – 7.3 depict each heterogeneous subject’s extraction
path in the baseline, limited-use, and moratorium treatments for the entire time horizon.
Examination of figures 7.1 – 7.3 shows a high level of “interlocational noise” or
decision-making variability among all the different producers despite location.
Intuitively, theoretical optimal control predictions assume that rational producers would
choose greater early period extraction rates, but decreases extraction rates over time until
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potentially a steady state extraction rate is reached. However, unlike the intuitive paths,
the averaged experimental extraction paths in figures 7.1 – 7.3 display non-monotonic
decline across each time period. As expected, location 1’s extraction path reflects a fairly
constant linear extraction path.
However, the other locations seem to depict a quadratic-shaped extraction path.
The majority of the down gradient locations display high extraction rates decisions early
in the time horizon which may be explained by the ‘rule of capture’ from previous water
resource research. This assumption states that producers tend to choose high extraction
rates early on due to the high water levels which results in low pumping costs.
Reductions in the extraction rate may be attributed to rapid depletion of water
levels for each downstream location during the middle periods (periods 10 – 30) of the
time horizon. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 depict that in addition to increasing pumping costs that
result from depleting water levels, the credible threat of implementing future regulation
may have incentivized subjects to reduce their extraction rates. Therefore, each subject is
aware of profit reductions per period due to the lowered water levels or implementation
of a regulatory policy limiting the amount of water that may be extracted.
Figures 7.1 – 7.3 each show that during time periods 30 – 50, the majority of the
locations exhibit an uptick or steady increase in extraction rates. Madani & Dinar (2012)
best explain this decision phenomenon by stating producers aggressively withdraw the
resource because any point beyond the end of the time horizon is not considered in the
decision making process. Since subjects knew the time horizon consisted of 50
production cycles, experimental subjects’ extraction decisions may have been impacted
by the ‘end of period effects’ explained by Madani & Dinar (2012). Therefore, the
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econometric model must account and control for quadratic extraction since many of the
locations’ extraction paths generally display this shape.
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Figure 7.1

Location 2

Location 3

Location 4

Location 5

Each location’s extraction path in no-regulation treatment
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Location 6
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Each location’s extraction path in limited-use treatment
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Location 6
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Location 6

Each location’s extraction path in moratorium treatment

Table 7.1 reports the average extraction rate cross-sections statistical results when
estimating equation (6.1) occurring over the entire time horizon derived by the Parks
method estimator. This econometric model allows differences in the extraction rate
estimates to be interpreted as intercept shifts or “path shifts” when compared to the
intercept or position 1 within the no-regulation treatment. The parameter estimates for
treatment 2 represent location 1 in the limited-use treatment and treatment 3 represent
location 1 in the moratorium treatment. The resulting significant parameter estimates can
then be used to test the expected propositions where significance can be attributed to
either a location or treatment effect. Excluding location 2, table 5 shows all other
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locations resulted in significantly lowered shifts in extraction rate paths, but vary as to
which effect caused significant change.
When examining location 1’s extraction decisions in the regulatory treatments,
both yielded significantly higher extraction rate path estimates. Location 2’s limited-use
and moratorium interaction terms resulted in significant extraction reductions due to a
treatment effect. Table 7.1 shows that both location 3’s extraction estimate in the noregulation and limited-use treatments experienced significant reductions. This indicates
that location 3 experienced a location effect within the no-regulation treatment and a
treatment effect within the limited-use treatment. Further examination of table 7.1
reveals that locations 4 – 6’s no-regulation extraction estimate resulted in significant
extraction reductions. Therefore, the reductions in extraction rates occurring in locations
4 – 6 were caused by a location effect due to the heterogeneity in subject locations.
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Table 7.1

Extraction path fixed effects of potential regulation treatment results
(DFE = 864)
Y = Extraction Rate
Parameter Estimate
(S.E.)

Independent Variables
Intercept

9.37***
(0.35)
-0.26
(0.41)
-1.29***
(0.48)
1.81***
(0.61)
-2.20***
(0.58)
-2.62***
(0.40)
0.60*
(0.36)
0.78**
(0.33)
-1.12**
(0.47)
-1.59***
(0.40)
-1.38***
(0.50)
-0.76
(0.53)
-0.75
(0.73)
-0.91
(0.69)
-0.75
(0.72)
-0.68
(0.66)
-0.53
(0.50)
-0.47
(0.58)
-0.09***
(0.01)
0.002***
(0.0002)
0.69

Position 2
Position 3
Position 4
Position 5
Position 6
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Position 2 | Limited-Use Regulation
Position 2 | Moratorium Regulation
Position 3 | Limited-Use Regulation
Position 3 | Moratorium Regulation
Position 4 | Limited-Use Regulation
Position 4 | Moratorium Regulation
Position 5 | Limited-Use Regulation
Position 5 | Moratorium Regulation
Position 6 | Limited-Use Regulation
Position 6 | Moratorium Regulation
Period
Period 2
R-Square

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Wald tests were conducted to analyze any significant changes across locations
within a specific treatment. Tables 7.2 – 7.4 exhibit Wald tests matrices of pairwise
extraction comparisons across locations for the baseline, limited-use, and moratorium
treatments. Table 7.5 exhibits a Wald test matrix of the same location’s pairwise
extraction comparison across the regulatory treatments. Each value in tables 7.2 – 7.5
report the row parameter estimate difference versus the column estimate. Positive values
indicate increased extraction in the column location’s estimate when compared to the row
location’s extraction estimate. Negative values indicate decreases extraction in the
column location’s estimate when compared to the row location’s extraction estimate.
Table 7.2 displays pairwise extraction comparisons across locations in the noregulation treatment. Column 1 reports downstream locations’ Wald test parameter
estimates when compared to location 1. Excluding location 2, location 1’s no-regulation
extraction estimate was not only significantly greater but increased when moving further
away from location 1 within locations 3 – 6. Column 2 displays that location 2’s noregulation extraction estimate was not only significantly greater but the difference
increased when moving further away from location 2 within locations 3 – 6. Column 3
displays that location 3’s no-regulation extraction estimate was also significantly greater
and the difference increased for locations 5 and 6.
Table 7.3 displays pairwise extraction comparisons across locations in the
limited-use treatment. When compared back to location 1, column 1 displays a
significant reduction in extraction rates resulting in only locations 2 and 3. All other
pairwise comparisons resulted in non-significance.
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Table 7.4 displays pairwise extraction comparisons across locations within the
moratorium treatment. Column 1 compares all locations’ estimates back to location 1
which results in significantly different extraction rates for locations 2 – 4. The only other
significantly different extraction rate within this treatment occurred when comparing
location 2’s and location 6’s extraction rate. This is the only pairwise comparison where
the most down gradient location resulted in a significantly increased difference in
extraction rate.
In summary, all the resulting significant pairwise comparison row locations’
estimate exhibit decreased extraction rates when compared to the column locations. In
tables 7.2 and 7.3, all highly significant pairwise comparison also exhibit increasing
reductions in location’s extraction rates further away from the compared location.
However, table 7.4 (moratorium treatment), the significant pairwise comparisons do not
show this same pattern when compared to location 1, and the furthest location (location
6) increased extraction when compared to location 2.
Table 7.2

Location 1
Location 2
Location 3
Location 4
Location 5
Location 6

Row versus column ceteris paribus pairwise extraction comparison
differences across locations
Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5
N/A
0.26
N/A
1.29***
1.03***
N/A
1.81***
1.55**
0.52
N/A
2.20***
1.94***
0.91**
0.39
N/A
2.62***
2.36***
1.33***
0.81
0.42

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Location 6

N/A

Table 7.3

Location 1
Location 2
Location 3
Location 4
Location 5
Location 6

Row versus column limited-use treatment pairwise extraction comparison
across location
Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5
N/A
1.72**
N/A
1.98**
0.26
N/A
2.41
-0.37
-0.63
N/A
2.80
-0.37
-0.63
0.00
N/A
1.13
-0.59
-0.85
-0.22
-0.22

Location 6

N/A

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 7.4

Location 1
Location 2
Location 3
Location 4
Location 5
Location 6

Row versus column moratorium treatment pairwise extraction comparison
across location
Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5
N/A
2.37***
N/A
1.54*
-0.83
N/A
1.69*
-0.68
0.15
N/A
1.46
-0.91
-0.08
-0.23
N/A
1.25
-1.12**
-0.29
-0.44
-0.21

Location 6

N/A

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 7.5

Location 1
Moratorium
Location 2
Moratorium
Location 3
Moratorium
Location 4
Moratorium
Location 5
Moratorium
Location 6
Moratorium

Row versus column same location pairwise extraction comparison across
regulatory treatment
Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5
limited-use limited-use limited-use limited-use limited-use
-0.18

Location 6
limited-use

0.47
-0.62
0.16
-0.07
-0.06

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Water Level Analysis
Some previous research modeled aquifers as a “bathtub” where each location’s
extraction results in homogeneous reduction in water level. However, this study
incorporates a generally uni-directional recharge gradient flow with some localized
recharge. Referring back to figure 1.2, location 1 represents an producer in Tunica
County who is at the initial entry point of the recharge flow received the maximum
recharge rate of 10 throughout the experiment. The directional recharge flow dynamic
then generally proceeds southward where the recharge rates for locations 2 – 6, however,
is dependent on the cumulative extractions from upstream locations. Therefore,
excluding location 1’s received recharge, all other producers’ recharge rates depicts an
inverse relationship to upstream producers’ extraction rates which is heterogeneous.
Figures 7.4 – 7.6 depict each producers’ water level paths for each treatment. The
red horizontal line at 5.55 feet represents the water level when reached by half of the
locations, would trigger the implementation of the respective regulation. Only locations
2 – 6 will be discussed since location 1’s water level remains constant because their
recharge received is equivalent to the maximum allowed extraction. Excluding location
4, each location’s water level paths under no-regulation show steeper declining water
levels in the beginning time periods and then again near the end of the time horizon.
However, the slopes flattens out in the middle periods. This occurrence can be attributed
to the shape of the extraction paths in figure 1.2 where high upstream extraction rates
decrease the recharge rates received downstream. This necessarily increases the rate at
which the water levels decline for all downstream locations.
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When comparing the regulatory treatments to the no-regulation treatment, both
figures 7.5 and 7.6 depict decreased or flatter water level path slopes from t  1 to t  40 .
Across both regulatory treatments, although location 1 increased their extraction, location
2 decreased their extraction. The reduced extraction of location 2, exhibited by the flatter
slope, increased the recharge rate received by downstream locations, thus contributing to
reducing the rate of declining water levels.
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Individual location’s water level path in no-regulation treatment
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Location 6
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Aggregate Ending Water Levels
A simple mathematical solution of observed effects from the previous period
water level, recharge received, and the current period extraction rate results in the current
period water level for each respective location. Once the recharge rate is known for each
location, the current period beginning water level can be derived by subtracting the
previous period extraction from the beginning water level in the previous period and then
adding the recharge amount received. Each respective location is expected to have
heterogeneous water levels due to the heterogeneity of their locations.
The regulator’s main concern is the aggregate ending state of the aquifer. Each
location will know their respective ending water levels in the final time period which can
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then be aggregated to derive the ending state of the aquifer. By comparing the aggregate
ending state of the aquifer in each treatment will allow for a simple t-test to be conducted
in order to see if threatened regulation results in significant changes in the aggregate
ending state of the aquifer.
To begin, figure 7.7 depicts each producer’s ending water level contribution
toward aggregate water levels for each treatment. Location 1’s observed water level
remains constant because gi  w jt   wit  t . Therefore, location 1 will not be discussed
in this section. The main focus is focused on ending water levels for down gradient
locations 2 – 6. When comparing the no-regulation treatment to the limited-use
treatment, figure 7.7 shows every location resulted in higher individual ending water
levels within the limited-use treatment. However, locations 2 – 4 increased their
respective ending water levels while locations 5 and 6 resulted in reduced ending water
levels when comparing the no-regulation to the moratorium regulatory treatment.
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Average ending water levels across treatments by location

Figure 7.8 exhibits a substantial increase of 85.73 feet in aggregate ending water
level from a threat of implementing a limited-use policy if critically low water levels are
reached. Imposing a moratorium, however, resulted in minimal increase of 11.59 feet in
aggregate ending water level when compared to the baseline aggregate ending water
level. Since regulatory agencies’ principal concern is the aggregate ending state of the
aquifer, the more effective policy would be the limited-use regulation rather than the
moratorium because of a higher increase in ending water levels. Although figure 7.8
depicts a substantial increase in aggregate ending water levels paired t-test reveal that the
limited-use to the no-regulation treatment neither regulatory treatments resulted in
significance differences in aggregate ending water levels.
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Figure 7.8

Aggregate producers’ average ending water levels

Aggregate Ending Cumulative Profit
Figure 7.9 displays individual location’s average ending cumulative profits across
treatments. In regards to location 1, since the water level in each period is at the
maximum threshold coupled with the increased extraction rates, location 1’s ending
cumulative profits increased with regulation and the severity of the regulation. Across all
three treatments, only locations 4 and 5 captured their highest individual ending
cumulative profits in the no-regulation treatment. Location 2 was the only location to
capture their highest individual ending cumulative profits in the limited-use treatment.
While locations 1, 3, and 6 all saw their highest individual ending cumulative profits
within the moratorium treatment, locations 1 and 6 saw their respective individual ending
cumulative profits increasing as the regulation severity increased.
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Figure 7.9

Average ending cumulative profits across treatments by location

Figure 7.10 depicts the aggregate average ending cumulative profit within each
treatment. When comparing the no-regulation treatment to the limited-use treatment,
individual ending cumulative profits experienced a substantial decrease of 14,389.84
experimental tokens. The moratorium treatment, however, resulted in the highest societal
welfare level overall. Moratorium increased societal welfare by 1,913.59 tokens
compared to the baseline treatment, and increased societal welfare by 16,303.43
compared to the limited-use treatment.
Figure 7.10 depicts a decrease in aggregate ending cumulative profits when
comparing the no-regulation treatment with the limited-use treatment. Although there
exists a noticeable difference in aggregate ending cumulative profits, paired t-test results
indicate there were no significant differences in the ending cumulative profits.
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Figure 7.10

Aggregate average ending cumulative profit by treatment

Summary of Results
Overall, the experimental results indicate that the credible threat of imposing a
limited-use regulation achieved the objective which was to increase the aggregate ending
water levels. By examining figures 7.8 and 7.10, however, there exists an inverse
relationship between the realized ending water levels and cumulative profits which
implies more water will reduce cumulative profits. Further examination of experimental
results indicate that only the moratorium treatment slightly increased the realized
aggregate ending economic profits for all producers when compared to the no-regulation
treatment. With the exception of locations 2 and 4, all other heterogeneous locations’
extracted at the highest rate among the three treatments. Thus, the increased profits from
location 1, 3, and 6 outweighed the decreased profits of the other three producers. Any
additional recharge received downstream slowed the declining water levels from
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locations 2 and 4’s decreased appropriation even with the increased extraction from
downstream producers.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
The Mississippi Delta has experienced a significant reduction in irrigation water
stocks over time due to increased extraction rates. This research investigates the impacts
of various regulatory threats on producer water extraction to avert future over
exploitation of the MRVAA. If the strategic use of a regulatory threat were to be
successful in incentivizing producers to reduce their extraction rates, then costly
implementation of a limited-use regulation could be avoided. The main finding of the
research is that even with a draconian policy of complete shutdown, a lax regulatory
trigger point does not result in significantly slowing over exploitation of the water
resource.
This experimental research contributes to CPR literature by developing a
conceptual model and conducting laboratory experiments that include aquifer dynamics
relevant to the Mississippi Delta. Specifically, incorporating a unidirectional recharge
flow created sequentially ordered spatial externalities. By adding these setting
characteristics, this research lends insight into the impacts of locational heterogeneity
relative to producers in the Mississippi Delta, as well as these types of CPR dilemmas in
general.
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Policy Implications
Mississippi Delta producers are legitimately concerned about future
implementation of regulatory policies regarding allowable quantities of groundwater to
be extracted. Presently in the Mississippi Delta, no formal producer coalitions are
present, but may be formed in hopes to avoid potential implementation of future
exogenous regulations limiting allowable extracted water. A vast area comprising
numerous heterogeneous producers creates significant challenges in implementing a selfgoverning mechanism (Ostrom et al., 1999). Additionally, other obstacles hindering
potential self-governance may include myopic decision strategies and disregarding
negative externalities passed on to others. If these coalitions would organize and employ
an efficient self-governing mechanism, Mississippi Delta producers would avoid future,
potentially more restrictive, regulatory policies.
When self-governance is unachievable, an exogenously imposed mechanism
presents the last feasible alternative. In response to the reductions in the available
irrigation water, MDEQ has instituted some incremental regulations. These regulatory
changes include the shortening of the well permit life and satisfying the requirements
within the ‘acceptable agricultural water efficiency practices’ in hopes to incentivize
more efficient management of the MRVAA. Maximum allowable extraction for various
commodities has been implemented, but are not binding or monitored.
If limited-use regulation is sufficiently costly, regulators utilizing a credible threat
of regulation may benefit from incentivizing producers to cooperate in reducing water
usage, thus avoiding the likelihood of the implementation of regulation. However,
implementing an efficient regulation that incorporates the hydrological dynamics of the
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aquifer and producer location is extremely difficult. In the instant case, the particulars of
the MRVAA geological structure and flow dynamics are unverified, let alone
understanding of actual producer interrelationships. Information regarding these
uncertainties would allow MDEQ to better understand the current state of the aquifer
before formulating future regulatory policies.
Limitations
This research acknowledges several limitations within the model development
and experimental design. The first limitation involves the lack of a closed form solution
to the Hamiltonians presented, which would generate a more stringent baseline
comparator, but only for the no-regulation treatment. In regards to the game theoretic
implications of the regulatory threat, previous CPR experiments conclude a derived
theoretical [Nash] equilibrium does not necessarily guarantee experimental subjects will
arrive and stabilize at this equilibrium (Walker & Gardner, 1992; Keser & Gardner,
1999).
A second limitation regards player information. Most of the previous studies
acknowledge varying levels of information impact the strategic behavior in experiments,
especially non-cooperative frameworks (e.g. Gardner et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1999; Madani
&Dinar, 2012). Complete and perfect information in some metrics, as in this research,
resulted in producers having knowledge of rival costs, relative payoffs, decision
interdependence, and the history of rival extraction thus far. Many times, CPR
experiments incorporate complete and perfect information to simplify the design of
complex adaptive resource systems. However, this experimental study employed
imperfect information in regards to the status of rival water levels, an important metric
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for decisions regarding regulation avoidance and one in which MDEQ roughly provides
producers in the MRVAA. This required subjects in the regulatory treatments to update
beliefs. In this regard, subjects based their current and future extraction decisions on
heuristic beliefs of the state of rival water levels.
Future Research and Extensions
A future research extension would be to have a better estimation of the geological
dynamics specific to the MRVAA. A GIS mapping of the aquifer would provide realistic
parameter values to be incorporated into the experimental design. This would inform
regulators, as well as policymakers, more directly of how future regulations would impact
whom and to what extent.
Another extension would to experimentally test varying degrees of information
about rival decisions ranging from perfect information to complete uncertainty. Altering
information levels may change individual producer’s beliefs of their rival’s decision
strategies as well as their own.
A third extension would be to derive a closed form solution of optimal paths from
the Hamiltonian. Accomplishing this would allow for direct comparisons of optimal and
experimental paths in order to identify any sub-optimal deviations from the noncooperative equilibrium taken by experimental subjects. These optimal paths would
provide a stronger comparison to the unregulated state.
The fourth extension would be to modify the regulatory trigger point in the
experimental design. The current trigger point was set when half of the producers
experienced relatively low water levels (5.55 feet of available water). This relatively lax
trigger point could be perceived as a non-binding regulatory mechanism. Raising the
75

trigger point, to potentially 50 feet, may incentivize significantly lower and sustained
extraction rates within in the time horizon.
A fifth potential extension would be to establish credible threats of regulation
through local voting. Within future experiments, after each production period, all
producers would cast a vote and if 50% of the producers vote for regulation, then the
regulatory policy would be implemented no matter where the water levels are in that
current time period. Therefore, the trigger mechanism is based on the majority of votes
wanting regulation. This may identify the formation of coalition of various types of
producers in regards to recharge endowment (location), potentially among those most
recharge disadvantaged.
Lastly, an extension possibility would be to multiple crops and vary output prices
across time. Changing output prices allows for the examination of impacts on crop
selection. Therefore, if the profitability of water intensive crops (e.g., corn and soybeans)
fall below less water intensive crops (e.g., cotton), this may result in reduced irrigation
needs, in turn reducing water demand and lessening the dependence on costly regulation.
Future research applying these six extensions would better inform all stakeholders
in the Delta region. Future extensions of this research would allow for higher efficiency
in current water resource management, as well as leaving the aquifer in a better state for
the next generation of producers.
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APPENDIX A
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD PROTOCOL APPROVAL AND
ATTACHMENTS DOCUMENTS

81

Mississippi State University requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol
approval for all human subject experiments. The finalized IRB approval to conduct
human experiments is included in this appendix in addition to the attachments that
include: a sample experimental session general announcement flyer, a sample sign-up
sheet, an informed consent form, a sample payment receipt form, and the water game
experiment instructions for the baseline treatment.

From:

nrs54@msstate.edu

Sent Date:

Wednesday, April 12, 2017 14:44:32 PM

To:
scw46@msstate.edu, jb928@msstate.edu, ktc76@msstate.edu Cc:
Bcc:
Subject: IRB Protocol Approved: IRB-17-198, Steven Wilhelms Message:
IRB has approved the protocol with the following details.
Protocol ID: IRB-17-198
Principal Investigator: Steven Wilhelms
Department: Agricultural Economics
Protocol Title: Mitigating a Commons Dilemma: Agricultural Water Use in the Mississippi Delta
Review Type: EXEMPT
Approval Date: April 12, 2017
Expiration Date: April 12, 2018
To access your approval documents, log into myProtocol and click on the protocol number to open the
approved study. Your official approval letter can be found under the Event History section. For nonexempt approved studies, all stamped documents (e.g., consent, recruitment) can be found in the
Attachment section and are labeled accordingly.
If you have any questions that the HRPP can assist you in answering, please do not hesitate to contact us at
irb@research.msstate.edu or 662.325.3994.

Figure A.1

Email providing IRB approval for conducting human experiments
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Economic Experiment General Announcement
Don’t pass up this excellent opportunity to try out your economic decision skills in a
water extraction choice experiment resulting in earning a considerable amount of real
$money$. Earnings per experiment are expected to range from $20 to $30, plus a
$5 show-up bonus.
Who?
All agricultural economics, economics, forestry, agronomy, plant soil science,
accounting, and finance students with a junior, senior or graduate standing.
When?
Experiments will be conducted the Week of April 17th - April 20th and the Week of
April 24th - April 28th at 3:30pm each day and last roughly 90 minutes.
Where?
Sessions will be held in Experimental Teaching Laboratory (Room 1), Lloyd-RicksWatson Building.
To sign up, contact Chris Wilhelms by email scw46@msstate.edu. You may sign up
once per experiment.
If you have any questions or to inquire about available sessions please contact:
Chris Wilhelms scw46@msstate.edu
Lloyd-Ricks-Watson, Room 02
(662) 325-7983
Dr. Kalyn T. Coatney
coatney@agecon.msstate.edu
Lloyd-Ricks-Watson, Room 365
(662) 325-7983
Figure A.2

Sample Experimental Session Announcement
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Sign-Up Sheet for Water Extraction Choice Experiment
Please print your name below if you wish to participate in an experiment sponsored by
the Department of Agricultural Economics. By participating you will have the
opportunity to earn a considerable amount of money. The experiment will last
approximately 1 to 1½ hours.
Confidentiality
All Consent forms, payment records, and data is kept confidential. Subjects are
identified by number only in stored data. Please note that these records will be held by
a state entity and therefore are subject to disclosure if required by law. Research
information may be shared with the MSU Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP).
Voluntary Participation
Please understand that your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits.
Questions
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Mr.
Steven Christopher Wilhelms at 662-325-7983
For questions regarding your rights as a research participant, or to discuss problems,
express concerns or complaints, request information, or offer input, please feel free to
contact the MSU Research Compliance Office by phone at 01-662-325-3994, by e-mail
at irb@research.msstate.edu, or on the web at
http://orc.msstate.edu/humansubjects/participant/.
This sheet is for the experiment to be held on April 17th at 3:30 pm in Experimental
Teaching Laboratory (Room 1) Lloyd-Ricks-Watson Building.
Name

SIGN UP SHEET
Email
Major

1
2
…
18
Alternate

Figure A.3

Sample sign-up sheet
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Classification

Informed Consent Form for Participation in Research for Exempt Research
Title of Research Study: Mitigating a Commons Dilemma: Agricultural Water Use
in the Mississippi Delta
Researcher(s): Steven Christopher Wilhelms and Dr. Kalyn T. Coatney, Mississippi
State University, Department of Agricultural Economics
Procedures: You will be asked to participate in a water extraction game. You will
participate in an producer choice experiment in which you will be an producer
choosing how much groundwater to extract to produce an output. In this role, you
will participate in one practice round to familiarize yourself with the choice
experiment. You will then participate in 50 production rounds where you will make
an extraction decision within each round that will determine the majority of your final
payoff for the market experiment today. Your participation in this experiment will
last approximately 1 to 1 ½ hours. At the end of the experimental session today, your
total payoffs will be determined, which will be added to the initial show-up fee, and
you will be paid in cash.
Questions: If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to
contact Mr. Steven Christopher Wilhelms at 662-325-7983 or scw46@msstate.edu
Voluntary Participation: Please understand that your participation is voluntary.
Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue your participation at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits.
Please take all the time you need to read through this document and decide
whether you would like to participate in this research study.
If you decide to participate, your completion of the research procedures indicates
your consent. Please keep this form for your records.
*The MSU HRPP has granted an exemption for this research. Therefore, a formal
review of this consent document was not required.

Figure A.4

Informed consent form for participation in research for exempt research
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
WATER STUDY

COMPLETE THIS FORM IN INK ONLY!

DATE:________________________________
NAME:_________________________________________________
(please print name)
MSU ID #:___________________________________
HOME ADDRESS:
(Permanent)

_______________________________________
(please print)
_______________________________________
City
State
Zip

I have participated in a Water Extraction Game Study at Mississippi State
University conducted by the Department of Agricultural Economics.
I received $______________ in the form of a Cash

from _____________________________.
(Signature of Experiment Director)

______________________________________
(Signature of Participant)

Figure A.5

Experiment participation payment form
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Thank you all for your attendance today!
We appreciate you taking the time out of your day to contribute invaluable data
towards our research.
Please take this time to turn off cell phones or set to vibrate if you are expecting an
extremely important call or text message. Thank you for complying with our request.
i.

The Role of an Experimental Subject and Earnings

 You will be an producer who decides on the quantity of water to extract for
application toward your output within a production period.
 Your earnings for each period are determined by the difference between the value of
the total output and total costs of production.
 You will be engaged in numerous periods of production.
 Your total earnings for the experiment today will equal the sum of your payoffs from
each production period.
 Your earnings are recorded as a fictitious currency called tokens.
 At the conclusion of the experiment today, you will be paid in dollars at an
undisclosed exchange rate.
ii.

Experimental Setting and Payoff Description

 The experiment you are engaged in today focuses on producers’ water extraction
decisions from an aquifer over time.
 Aquifer Characteristics: The aquifer is largely recharged at a single location and
generally flows in a common direction.
 Producers extract groundwater in each period to produce an arbitrary farm output.
Increasing the extraction of water increases total output resulting in increased period
revenues.
Figure A.6

Water game experiment instructions for the baseline treatment
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 Producer Interrelationships: Producers are located along the directional flow of the
aquifer. The cumulative extraction by upstream producers necessarily reduces the
recharge rate of downstream producers. The impact on recharge is the greatest by
each producer’s immediate upstream neighbor. However, the extraction of
downstream producers does not impact the recharge rate of upstream producers.
 If extraction is greater than the recharge rate, the producer’s water level necessarily
declines.
 If a producer’s water level decreases, more energy is required to lift the groundwater
which will result in higher production costs.
 If extraction costs increase relative to a constant revenue, then producer profit
necessarily declines across periods.
 If a producer either runs out of water or chooses not to extract, then that producer’s
returns are that of no extraction.
 Therefore, individual producer period earnings are determined by i) the individual
producer’s water extraction, ii) the upstream producer(s) water extraction rates, as
well as iii) the history of all producers’ extraction.
iii.

Experimental Procedures

 You will compete in 3 separate rounds today. Initially, you will be randomly
positioned within the aquifer where you will stay throughout the entire experiment.
 You will observe that each round consists of 50 production periods.
 You will choose the amount of water extracted from the aquifer in each period.
Potential extraction choices range from 0-10. Choosing 0 will result in the minimum
output yield (dryland returns) and 10 is the maximum allowable extraction resulting
in the maximum output yield.

Figure A.6 (continued)
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Table 1. Max extraction and Resulting Impacts

Table 2. Reduced Extraction and Resulting Impacts

EXTRACTION CHOICES

EXTRACTION CHOICES

1
10

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
10
10
10

RETURNS

RETURNS

Time Period
1

1
6005

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
6005
6005
6005

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
2387.61
2387.61
6005

Time Period
1

1
10.00

2
8.50

Time Period
1

5
10

6
10

Time Period
1

1
1.5

2
1.5

FARMER POSITION
3
4
1.5
10

5
6005

6
6005

Time Period
1

1
2387.61

5
6.88

6
6.58

Time Period
1

1
10

2
9.78

WATER LEVEL

WATER LEVEL

1
100

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
93.69
92.95
92.46

1
100

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
94.94
94.83
94.76

COSTS

COSTS

1
260.00

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
323.12
330.51
335.43

1
238.75

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
259.08
259.25
312.40

PROFIT

PROFIT

1
5745.00

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
5681.88
5674.49
5669.57

1
2148.86

FARMER POSITION
2
3
4
2128.53
2128.36
5692.60

RECHARGE

Time Period
1

Time Period
1

Time Period
1

5
10

6
10

5
6005

6
6005

5
8.28

6
7.61

5
93.45

6
92.78

5
325.52

6
332.24

5
5679.48

6
5672.76

RECHARGE

FARMER POSITION
3
4
7.75
7.25

5
92.09

5
339.13

5
5665.87

6
91.79

Time Period
1

6
342.08

Time Period
1

6
5662.92

Time Period
1

FARMER POSITION
3
4
9.66
9.59

Table 3. Producer in Position 6’s History of Choices, Impacts, and Profits
Time

My
My
Extraction Recharge

Other Producers' Extraction

My
Water
Level

Per Period
Earnings

Cumulative
Earnings

t

e 1t

e 2t

e 3t

e 4t

e 5t

e 6t

g 6 (e jt )

S 6t

π6t

Σπ 6 t

1
2
3
4
5

10
1.5
3.6
4.2
7.2

10
1.5
3.6
4.9
8.4

10
1.5
3.6
5.3
8.7

10
1.5
3.6
6.4
9.3

10
1.5
3.6
8.9
9.7

10
10
8.7
9.4
7.9

6.58
9.49
8.77
7.61
6.88

91.79
89.66
82.92
73.51
64.36

5662.92
5641.62
5511.95
5478.03
5243.15

5662.92
11304.53
16816.49
22294.52
27537.67

 The higher extraction choices necessarily results in additional period revenues than
lower extraction choices. Your extraction choice may be rounded to the nearest
hundredth of a decimal (e.g. 2.7 or 7.3).
 You will also observe in both Table 1 and 2 how upstream producers’ extraction
choices directly impact your recharge rate which also indirectly impacts your
remaining available water level.
Figure A.6 (continued)
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 Table 3 will report the history of your: extraction decision, recharge rate, remaining
available water level, per period earnings, and a running tally of those earnings. This
will also include all other producers’ extraction choices in order to map out the
history of all producers’ extraction choices and the resulting relative impacts.
 Notice that per period earnings are decreasing after each time period. This is a direct
result of the difference between the total value of your outputs from extraction and
decreasing remaining available water. Therefore as water levels decrease, the costs of
extraction (due to need for additional energy to lift the water) increases and profits
decrease (due to the relationship between a constant revenue and increasing
extraction costs).
 You may also enter an extraction choice less than the remaining available water in
any time period to avoid completely running out of water. However, you will NOT
be allowed to enter an extraction decision exceeding the available water level in any
respective production period. If either you run out of water or choose not to extract,
you will receive dryland returns.
 Once completely out of water, you will not be allowed to make another extraction
choice for the remainder of the round.
Figure A.6 (continued)
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Time

My
My
Extraction Recharge

Other Producers' Extraction

My
Water
Level

Per Period
Earnings

Cumulative
Earnings

t

e 1t

e 2t

e 3t

e 4t

e 5t

e 6t

g 6 (e jt )

S 6t

π6t

Σπ 6 t

1
2
3
4
5

10
1.5
3.6
4.2
7.2

10
1.5
3.6
4.9
8.4

10
1.5
3.6
5.3
8.7

10
1.5
3.6
6.4
9.3

10
1.5
3.6
8.9
9.7

10
10
8.7
9.4
7.9

6.58
9.49
8.77
7.61
6.88

91.79
89.66
82.92
73.51
64.36

5662.92
5641.62
5511.95
5478.03
5243.15

5662.92
11304.53
16816.49
22294.52
27537.67

Extraction Choice:

OK

 At the beginning of each round, the moderator will instruct the producers to make
their first time period’s extraction choice.
 You will be given 30 seconds to enter and submit your extraction choice for each
time period. Enter your extraction choice in the box to the right of ‘Extraction
Choice,” then click the box next to ‘OK’ to submit your extraction choice.
 Once all producers have entered and submitted their respective extraction choices, a
table depicting the history of all producers’ extraction choices and relative impacts
will be updated and the next production period begins.
 Upon completion of all 50 production periods, the next round will begin. Please wait
for the moderator to cue participants to begin making and submitting your next
round’s first period extraction choice.
 You will repeat this process until the completion of 3 rounds.

Figure A.6 (continued)
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At this time does anyone have any questions?
- Before beginning the experiment that determines your earnings, you will
complete 1 practice round consisting of 5 production periods that do not impact
your earnings for the experiment today. The extraction choices will not be timed
within the practice round to ensure all participants understand fully what to
expect in each successive production period.
- Please do not talk to other subjects or look on their computer screens during the
experiment.
- Remember, there are not right or wrong decisions, only those you believe that
are in your best interest.
- A reminder, you may enter extraction choices rounded to the nearest tenth of a
decimal if you like and your extraction choice may NOT exceed the remaining
available water level in any round.
- Please do not hesitate to ask questions during the practice round.
Let’s begin the Practice Round!
- Please click ‘OK’ on the bottom right of the screen on your desktop.
- Since the practice round is not timed, please wait patiently for all participants to
submit their respective extraction decision. The screen will automatically
progress to the next time period when all participants have submitted their
extraction choices.
- At this time, please make your first period extraction choice.
**[Upon completion of the practice round]**
- Are there any questions before starting the rounds that determine your
earnings?
- We are now beginning of the rounds that determine your earnings begin with
Round 1.
- Let’s Begin.
Figure A.6 (continued)
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REGULATION ADDENDUM:
When HALF the producers reach a water level of 5.55, this will trigger the
LIMITED-USE regulatory policy. Upon implementation of the limited-use
policy, all producers’ MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE extraction rate will be
REDUCED to (5.55) until all producers’ stock levels have reached the maximum
level.
 I will inform you privately when this policy has been triggered by pausing your
timer for the respective period and dropping off a slip of paper informing you of
the implementation of the regulatory policy. You may then enter any extraction
rate between 0 to 5.55, but remember that you cannot extract more than the
available water (e.g. regulation has been triggered, you choose to extract 5.55,
but your available water level is 2.48. The program will allow only 2.48). I
notify you that the policy has been lifted.
 NOTE: The program is NOT hard-coded to limit your extraction to 5.55!
This implies that if regulation has been triggered and even if your available
water level is greater than 5.55, PLEASE only submit an extraction decision
between 0 to 5.55 (MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE EXTRACTION = 5.55) until
policy is lifted. This will keep the integrity of the data and results.

Figure A.7

Experimental regulation addendum for limited-use treatment
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REGULATION ADDENDUM:
When HALF the producers reach a water level of 5.55, this will trigger the
MORATORIUM regulatory policy. Upon implementation of the moratorium
policy, all producers will NOT be able to extract any water until all producers’
stock levels have reached the maximum level. This will result in all subjects’
payoffs (profit) to be 750 tokens until the policy has been lifted.
 I will inform you privately when this policy has been triggered by pausing your
timer for the respective period and dropping off a slip of paper informing you
that the regulatory policy has been implemented. You will then enter “0” for
your extraction choice until I notify you that the policy has been lifted.
 NOTE: The program is NOT hard-coded to ensure you enter “0!” This
implies that if regulation has been triggered, the program will allow you to still
enter any extraction choices, BUT PLEASE enter “0” until the policy is lifted.
This will keep the integrity of the data and results.

Figure A.8

Experimental regulation addendum for moratorium treatment
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